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Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports

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04.08.2023

Auction Theory and Device Bidding Functions for Transactive Energy Systems: A Review

verfasst von: Akshay Sreekumar, Adhithyan Sakthivelu, Lynne Kiesling

Erschienen in: Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports | Ausgabe 3/2023

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Abstract

Purpose of Review

Decentralized market-based coordination can provide grid stability with increasing intermittent distributed energy resources in the electricity grid while also incorporating individual preferences. To deploy these transactive energy mechanisms effectively, understanding both the market design and the device’s participation through the bidding strategies is crucial. This paper reviews the auction theory and bidding function literatures underlying device participation in transactive energy systems.

Recent Findings

After review of newer and seminal literatures for auction theory and device’s bidding strategies, we categorized the strategies based on the price discovery algorithms: game-theoretic, heuristic, data-driven, and optimal categories.

Summary

The auction theory and device bidding function literatures reviewed here demonstrate the potential value of a transactive energy design that enables both seller offers and buyer bids, which will facilitate increased system flexibility as more participants become prosumers.

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We use the term “owner-operator” because sometimes the owner and the operator of a device are not the same person. Choices and actions will differ depending on those relationships.

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Titel: Auction Theory and Device Bidding Functions for Transactive Energy Systems: A Review
verfasst von: Akshay Sreekumar
Adhithyan Sakthivelu
Lynne Kiesling
Publikationsdatum: 04.08.2023
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Erschienen in: Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports / Ausgabe 3/2023
Elektronische ISSN: 2196-3010
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40518-023-00217-2

Springer Professional

Abstract

Purpose of Review

Recent Findings

Summary

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