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Abstract
Natural resources—blessing or curse? Indonesia provides an excellent case study for an examination of this question. It is a major commodity exporter; the fourth most populous country in the world; and the world’s largest archipelagic state with huge mineral, forest, and maritime resources. Indonesia also has three distinctive features that are particularly relevant for such a study. First, with the exception of the Asian financial and pandemic crises, it has had at least moderately strong economic performance for the past half century. This distinguishes it from the majority of resource-rich developing countries, and therefore there are lessons to be learnt from its management of these boom-and-bust episodes, particularly the latter. Second, Indonesia has experienced two rather different resource booms: the first based mainly on oil and gas in the 1970s and the second based primarily on coal, palm oil, and gas over the years 2005–2011. The economic, social, and environmental impacts of these two booms have differed significantly. Third, the country experienced major regime change in 1998–1999, from the centralized, authoritarian Soeharto regime 1966–1998, which presided over the first boom, to the subsequent democratic, decentralized regime during the second boom. The very different political and institutional arrangements had important implications for the management of the boom and its distributional impacts. We examine these issues in comparative context, employing as reference points two very large natural resource exporters, Brazil and Nigeria, and Malaysia, a smaller, more dynamic East Asian comparator.
Consistent with the original resource curse literature, although the paper focuses primarily on the economic dimensions, a twenty-first-century perspective would give more attention to environmental aspects and particularly the energy transition to a low-carbon economy. In this respect, Indonesia is still in the early stages of such a transition and in the sustainable maintenance of its forest, maritime, and other natural resources.
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The other three developing economy exceptions are the two special cases of Asian city states and the one high-growth African economy, Botswana, noting also that ‘developing’ applies in the past tense to the city states.
We tested for the coefficient’s statistical significance in each case. In Fig. 5.1, the coefficient is significant at 95%. However, in the case of Fig. 5.2, the coefficient is not statistically significant, even at 90%, and regardless of whether outliers are included or excluded. This is suggestive of a more general point, beyond the scope of this paper, that the power of the resource curse thesis may be weakening over time.
The comparative multi-country study by Gelb and Associates (1988) was one of the first detailed analyses of the aftermath of the 1970s oil boom, when many commodity exporters experienced a lost decade of debt and stagnation during the 1980s. Little et al. (1993), Chaps. 4 and 5) document this debt crisis episode in great detail.
In passing, it is worth noting also that one of the smallest rent years was 1997. That is, commodity prices were of little economic assistance during the Asian financial crisis. As the literature on the AFC makes clear, however, there was no causal connection between these low commodity prices and the crisis.
The precise measurement of Indonesia’s RER is a matter of ongoing debate. For an early discussion of the technicalities, see Warr (1984). Garnaut (2015) discusses exchange rate policy during the more recent boom.
Little et al. (1993, Chap. 9) survey much of this earlier literature through to around 1990, and mainly in the context of the link between trade policy and macroeconomic crises.
The attraction of the Sachs-Warner index is its binary simplicity. It does not, of course, purport to provide a detailed description of each country’s trade regimes. The regular WTO country Trade Policy Reviews provide this information. We computed alternative indicators such as trade/GDP, non-commodity trade/non-commodity GDP, and average tariff rates, but the conclusion is essentially similar, and these indicators are also subject to well-known limitations.
One could in principle add an indicator of capital account openness, on the premise that more open capital accounts could smooth the adjustment path in response to terms of trade volatility. However, it is not clear what indicator could be used. Capital flows (relative to GDP) include both long- and short-term capital, portfolio, FDI, and concessional flows. Ideally, these various components need to be separately identified. For example, during crisis episodes—which frequently occur in the ‘bust’ episodes—there is the phenomenon of ‘firesale FDI’, that is, inward FDI attracted to the now cheaper domestic asset prices, the latter the result of the crisis and the accompanying capital flight.
This conclusion needs to be supported with reference to detailed case studies of key institutions, including the bureaucracy (on which see, for example, ADB 2020 for a recent study), the legal system, the media, and other independent checks on government.
One of the few exceptions that systematically explores the relationship between forest resources and oil wealth is Wunder (2003). Drawing on the Dutch Disease literature discussed above, he points that an oil boom may have a positive effect on the forests to the extent that the boom reduces the international competitiveness of other tradable sectors, including forestry. But the effects may be ambiguous. For example, the oil wealth may finance an extension of the road network, and land clearing may occur in the process of mineral exploration.
There is a considerable literature on climate change issues and policy in Indonesia. Of particular note is the comprehensive recent analysis provided by Basri and Riefky (2023).
Recall also that Indonesia is now a net oil importer, and therefore there is a direct budgetary impost from importing oil and on-selling it on the domestic market at a loss.
See McCawley (1978) for a detailed analysis of the Pertamina debacle. Its debts at one stage were equivalent to 30% of GDP. It is a matter of speculation what the scale of losses could have been if left unchecked.
See the extensive discussions of this issue in the Patunru et al. (2018) volume. Indonesia’s political economy construct was such that the positive correlation between economic nationalism and commodity prices was stronger in the first boom. See Basri (2001).
Of course, localized conflict has been an ever-present feature of Indonesia. It was most serious in 1997–1999 following the generalized breakdown of law and order during the AFC. There have also been long-running separatist movements in the outlying and resource-rich regions of Aceh (now brought under control) and Papua. Papua is, however, a special case: although resource-abundant (principally its two huge mining operations, one in each Papua province), the fundamental grievances have been political, reflecting the manner of the region’s controversial incorporation into the Republic (Resosudarmo et al. 2014a, 2014b).