Institutional Capacity and the Roles of Key Actors in Fire Disaster Risk Reduction: The Case of Ibadan, Nigeria

The increasing fire disaster-related loss of life, property damage, and harmful effects on the environment have attracted global attention on the need for fire disaster management based on a proactive approach that forestalls potential risks and tackles fire hazard at the pre-stage (Dube 2015; Weekes and Bello 2019). Fire disaster management has been evolving with greater attention being drawn to preventive mechanism and preparedness measures. This is consequent on the realization that uncontrolled fire remains a major cause of loss, injury, and destruction of lives and property (Navitas 2014; Shokouhi et al. 2019). It is thus apparent that focusing on post-fire disaster activities, such as search and rescue and distribution of relief items to disaster-affected individuals alone is insufficient for the sustainable management of fire and other hazards (Kasim 2014; Glago 2020).

The motivating concepts that guide fire management throughout the world are the reduction of damage to property, protection of life, and reduction of environment degradation (Martin et al. 2007; Coppola 2015; Santín and Doerr 2016; Tymstra et al. 2020). However, the local and institutional capacity to actualize this mission is widely uneven (Agbola and Falola 2021; Bello et al. 2021). While no country, regardless of economic status and level of development, has built a capacity to be completely invulnerable to fire disaster (Coppola 2015), cities of developing countries are particularly adjudged to have weak capacity to achieve sustainable fire disaster management (Bello et al. 2021). Henderson (2004) and Hallegatte et al. (2020) attributed the nature of vulnerability of cities of developing countries to poor socioeconomic conditions, poor governance structure, and poor infrastructural facilities. Fire safety consideration is usually not taken seriously when planning, designing, and constructing new buildings or during repairs, renovation, modification, and rehabilitation of existing buildings (Woodrow 2012; Ivanov et al. 2022). The situation is worse in urban areas of developing countries where fire disasters repeatedly take place in buildings with no evidence of incorporating lessons learned from earlier fires (Cobin 2013). This is the commonality of fire management in most Nigerian cities, including Ibadan.

Efforts to manage fire by the government through the established fire services and the emergency management agencies have not been productive. The inherent fire risk in Ibadan and many other cities in Nigeria is heightened by apparent prioritization of distribution of relief items that will assist affected individuals in recovering from the impact of fire disaster at the expense of proactive measures involving prevention, mitigation, and preparedness. As observed by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2012), for instance, there was no budgetary allocation that was devoted to disaster risk reduction (DRR) at the state level. Virtually all of the annual allocations that were approved by the ministry of finance were for disaster response purposes (IFRC 2012). It shows that the government is more interested in post-disaster crisis management (rescue, relief, and recovery measures) than in pre-disaster risk management (prevention, mitigation, and preparedness for prompt response).

In addition, there is no specific law geared towards addressing the underlying factors predisposing human settlements to fire risks at all levels of government. More than a decade after it was drafted, the National Building Code (NBC) of 2006 is yet to be passed into law by the National Assembly. The existing planning laws and space standards at the federal and state levels that were supposed to curtail the spate of fire disasters have not been properly implemented and enforced (Oyo State Government 2016; Wahab and Falola 2016; Agbola and Falola 2021).

To achieve sustainable fire management, efforts need to be devoted to analyzing the existing community and institutional fire mitigation and preparedness measures in content and context. The analysis of the existing situation remains a prerequisite for adequate fire disaster risk reduction. Consequent upon the above, this study examined the institutional apparatus and the roles of key actors in fire disaster risk reduction in Ibadan as a prism for the situation in Nigerian cities. Key objectives pursued include: assessment of the legal and administrative structure for fire disaster management, and evaluation of equipment and facilities available for institutional preparedness for fire emergency.

The concept of urban governance provided the framework for this study. Governance is widely conceived to encompass national, state, and local governments and goes beyond them to include civil society and the private sector (FAO 2011; Weekes and Bello 2019). Within the fire disaster risk context, the concept of governance expresses the aggregate willingness, capacity, and ability of diverse actors to have coordinated actions in managing risks associated with fire hazards (CATALYST 2013). Good governance is the umbrella under which fire disaster preparedness take place. Ensuring safety and security of urban lives and properties is a prime indictor of good urban governance (Agbola 2001). The impact of governance is acknowledged as critical for applying state resources to reduce disaster risks (Agbola and Alabi 2010; Bello et al. 2021). Kasim (2014), Salami et al. (2017) and Hallegatte et al. (2020) argued that weak governance predisposed the urban settlements and city dwellers to increasing risk and vulnerability to disasters, such as fires. This is because effective management of fire disaster is dependent on appropriate policies, legislations, and strategies that are put in place to guide urban development as well as to enhance the preparedness capacity of the city (Weekes and Bello 2019). Poor or weak governance, with manifestations in the form of uncoordinated roles and responsibilities among government agencies, is a major impedance to effective fire disaster risk reduction (Wahab and Falola 2016). Actionable policy and effective legislation are directly related to the successful preparation for urban fire disasters (FAO 2011; FAO 2021). Good urban governance in terms of making suitable policies and laws, in conjunction with organizing public enlightenment, sensitization, and education on fire safety, will give individuals and communities at risk a sense of belonging, and will result in efficient preparedness measures for fire hazard (FAO 2011; FAO 2021).

Evidence from the literature shows that previous fire disasters in African urban areas exhibited similar commonalities of weak urban governance and associated poor emergency preparedness capacity. These include many fire disasters in public, educational, and commercial buildings in Tanzania (Kahwa 2009), Kenya (Muchira 2012; Ogajo 2013), Uganda (Kahwa 2009; Akumu 2013), and Nigeria (Ugwuanyi et al. 2015; Popoola et al. 2016; Agbola and Falola 2021; Alabi et al. 2021). In recent studies, significant relationships have been established between institutional arrangements for controlling urban growth and incidents of disasters (Wahab and Falola 2016; Wahab and Falola 2018; Agbola and Falola 2021). The nature of urban growth, especially when it is not matched with infrastructure and institutional frameworks that are necessary for adequate disaster preparedness, could be a major limitation to effective disaster risk reduction (Agbola et al. 2012; Ojo 2013; Bello et al. 2021). Ojo (2013) and Bello et al. (2021) argued that the losses and costs incurred from disasters are best regarded as consequences of multiple institutional inadequacies (that is, environmental, economic, political, and social dimensions), which predispose cities and their inhabitants to risks. Weak or inefficient institutional setup manifests in forms of non-enforcement of basic fire safety regulations (Wahab and Falola 2016); non-adherence to the building codes—a situation that hinders accessibility of fire vehicles to reach incident sites (Kahwa 2009; Alabi et al. 2021); lack of emergency exit doors; and lack of awareness of school management and parents on matters relating to fire safety (Kahwa 2009).

According to Karen (2009), events such as fire do not necessarily translate into disasters but institutional staff usually learn the advantages of emergency preparedness through difficult experiences. According to him, disasters can actually be managed, lessened, or totally prevented by broad, integrated disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. The foregoing attest to weak institutional capacity in most developing country cities in managing fire disasters. This and related urban fire management practices are assessed within the context of institutional preparedness capacity.

The study was carried out in Ibadan, which is the administrative and commercial center of Oyo State, Nigeria. Ibadan is located on the Gulf of Guinea, approximately 160 km from the Atlantic coast, 142 km northeast of Lagos, and 120 km east of the Republic of Benin (Fig. 1). It comprises 11 local government areas (LGAs) out of the 33 LGAs in Oyo State. The core of the city is made up of five LGAs and portions of each of the remaining six LGAs within Ibadan Region. The study area covers the 11 LGAs.

The population of the city grew faster in the six outer LGAs than in the five core LGAs. The implication of this trend is that there is an increasing movement of population to communities in the peri-urban areas from the congested city center where land is insufficient for physical development (Oyo State Government 2016). Ibadan City is one of the cities having the highest population density in Nigeria with the traditional core having the highest density in the city (Oyo State Government 2018). The implication of the rapid rate of urbanization, population growth, and urban expansion for fire disaster management is significant. The densely populated settlement exists within a context of improper land use planning, which has resulted in unpleasant situations and environmental challenges, such as housing shortage, poor quality housing, poor network of neighborhood access roads, slum development, and building fire disasters (Wahab and Falola 2018; Agbola and Falola 2021). The result is a city that is more prone to building fire disaster than ever before as documented by Agbola and Falola (2021).

A case study design was adopted in this research. This study incorporated descriptive and normative explorations. Descriptive research was employed to understand the nature and characteristics of the research problems that needed attention. In this case, the problem was weak institutional and community capacity to manage fire disasters in urban areas. Normative research was required to suggest how the problems should be addressed. This aspect helped in arriving at policy and practical recommendations required to improve fire disaster management in urban environments.

The data for this study were collected from secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources included relevant record-keeping institutions, such as the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Oyo State Emergency Management Agency (OYSEMA), the Bureau of Physical Planning and Development Control (BPPDC) of the Oyo State Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey (OMLS), Oyo State Fire Service (OSFS), civil society organizations (CSOs), and the Internet. Available records on major fire disasters in Ibadan were collected from the OSFS, NEMA, and OYSEMA. Similarly, records on the level of impacts, recommended response measures, and the actual government responses were obtained from the OYSEMA. Information and documentation on fire-related activities carried out by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) were gathered.

Primary data were obtained through field observations and key informant interviews. Direct observation was done to understand and get familiar with the existing situation in content and context. The direct observation was aided by a structured checklist to take inventory of available equipment in the fire service stations. Two key informant interviews were conducted with each of the selected stakeholders in fire management. These included officials of the OSFS, OYSEMA, NRCS, NSCDC, CSOs, FBOs, and landlord associations. Their roles and challenges faced in fire disaster management were the major focus of the interview sessions. Fourteen separate interview sessions were conducted in May and June, 2020. Specific questions relating to their involvement in the prevention, mitigation (such as enforcement), preparedness (such as early warning systems), response/relief measures, and recovery activities were captured in the interview guide. The interview sessions involved face-to-face interaction where experts’ views on inter- and intra-agency coordination in fire disaster management were documented. With adequate consideration of ethical issues, question schedules and voice recorders were used to record key aspects of the discussions. Consents of participants were sought and granted before interviews were conducted and before field observations were made.

This section presents the results of analysis of data obtained from primary and secondary sources. The major statutory organs that are responsible for fire disaster management were explored. The roles of key actors in fire disaster management and their implication for fire disaster risk reduction were reviewed.

In practice, the management of fire disasters by government institutions is mainly reactive. Different public agencies were responsible for different aspects of disaster management. Our results suggest weak institutional preparedness capacity, resources, and equipment to effectively manage fire disasters in buildings.

From the review of the administrative structure of FFS, it is apparent that the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, which is the administrative and political headquarters of Nigeria, was the best equipped city in terms of fire service personnel and equipment. The fact that the FFS did not have its offices and stations in all the states of the federation is also a testament to this. The gross inadequacy of personnel and equipment agrees with Agbili’s (2013) findings that among paramilitary forces and agencies in Nigeria, the federal fire service was the least equipped in terms of infrastructure and staff. Agreeing with Egunjobi and Falola (2017), many state governments, mindful of the low coverage of the FFS and their social and constitutional responsibilities to protect lives and property, established state-owned fire services.

The OSFS had the mandate to ensure effective fire mitigation, preparedness, and response in Ibadan City. However, the available equipment and personnel pointed to weak preparedness capacity to tackle emergency fire events. The agency was not furnished with adequate institutional apparatus to prepare for fire disasters. Fire stations were inadequate and the available ones were clustered in space. Fire service stations, firefighting vehicles, and water supply were grossly inadequate as only five out of the 11 LGAs in Ibadan had a public fire service station. Available fire stations fell short of international standards. This shortage was compounded with uneven distribution of fire stations across LGAs and lack of adequate firefighting equipment. The fact that fire stations were not evenly distributed implies that the level of preparedness varied across the city. Similarly, the available fire stations had different preparedness capacities based on differences in facilities, equipment, and personnel, as also revealed by Jonsson et al. (2017). The gross inadequacy of fire stations and firefighting equipment, as identified in this study, is a root cause that subjects Ibadan to high vulnerability to fire disaster. The high level of inadequacy of firefighting equipment has implications for institutional preparedness for a fire emergency. This, according to Agbola and Falola (2021), makes it difficult to ensure that vulnerable people gain prompt response to a fire emergency. Fire stations were not just inadequate; even the available ones were not adequately equipped. This finding supports the assertion of Agbola and Falola (2021) that no firefighting vehicle has been procured in the city in 15 years.

Our results suggest that the OYSEMA’s basic role in fire management was more of a channel where the state government provides aid measures and distributes relief items to individuals or groups affected by fire disasters. The best proactive measures that the agency undertook included awareness campaigns, community sensitization, and education on fire safety precautions and risk reduction, which were mostly done through media jingles on radio and television stations. In corroborating this finding, a civil servant retiree who had lived in Ibadan for over three decades revealed during an interview that the ruling parties often preferred to support individuals or groups that are directly affected by fire disasters by providing them with building materials (like roofing sheets and bags of cement), household goods (like mattresses and bed sheets), and money. This, according to him, was “to score political points” and win the hearts of the electorate.

There was no integrated institutional coordination for fire management between the three statutory bodies saddled with the responsibilities to manage fire emergencies. This poses a great burden on preparedness capacity. The bulk of state resources was channelled towards post-disaster relief and aid distribution to disaster-affected persons through the OYSEMA while the pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness phases (mainly executed by OSFS) were poorly funded. The lack of synergy among emergency agencies was consistent with previous studies, such as Jonsson et al. (2017), which identified increased fire risks as a result of inadequate cooperation between relevant urban departments. The result was also in line with Wahab and Falola’s (2016) findings that attributed urban encroachment on high disaster risk areas to lack of coordination among stakeholders in disaster management.

During the post-fire disaster reconstruction phase, little emphasis is placed on structural mitigating measures, such as provision of fire hydrants, firefighting equipment, sprinklers, and fire alarms in buildings. The relationship between increased fire disaster risks and failure to prioritize preparedness measures, like lack of financial commitment to setup fire stations and to purchase firefighting vehicles, was established in previous studies, such as Jonsson et al. (2017) and Shokouhi et al. (2019). Consequent upon institutional preparedness inadequacy, attempts at managing fires were made by some public and private institutions and organizations to set up well-equipped modern firefighting sections within the premises of the organizations. These organizations pointed to the failure of the OSFS and FSS in providing required service promptly during previous fire emergencies.

There was a consensus among stakeholders in fire management that, instead of putting so much resources on relief distribution, the government should focus more on sustainable approaches to fire disaster management, such as fire risk awareness, training on fire risk reduction, enforcement of fire safety regulations, equipping and expanding the state fire service, and distribution of fire safety materials.

This study revealed that the major contributions of the NEMA and OYSEMA to fire disaster management were reactive, mostly in the forms of search and rescue activities and distribution of relief materials. There is a need to shift focus from this post-disaster response to more proactive measures of disaster prevention and mitigation. This can be done by investing more in the distribution and installation of fire prevention/suppression items to building occupants and communities. This should be complemented with training on how to use the fire safety items. Fire hydrants should be made available to all major markets and vulnerable communities in the city. This will complement the activities of the fire service during emergencies. When fire safety items, such as extinguishers, fire blankets, fire alarms, and sand buckets are distributed or made available at subsidized prices to individuals, groups, and communities, the need to distribute relief items to fire-affected individuals and groups will reduce. This is because fire safety consciousness would increase, fire disasters would occur less frequently, damages caused by fire would be reduced, and fire services would be more effective.

The success of these recommendations will require drastic policy change that hinges on political will. The readiness to make and institutionalize sustainable fire management policies rests on the city managers who are predominantly politicians. However, this can be championed by stakeholders in fire management, which include professionals such as city planners, builders, engineers, and architects; professional organizations and groups in the built environment sector such as the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners (NITP); government and multinational organizations; NGOs such as the NRCS; and community-based organizations (CBOs) such as landlord or tenant associations and market associations. While professionals who practice in public agencies cannot speak or act against the government, they can work through professional bodies, the CBOs, and NGOs to effect changes that will favor sustainable urban settlement. These are interest groups that can advocate and lobby for policy change on sustainable fire management practices in the city.

This study highlights the legal and administrative structure for fire disaster management, with emphasis on equipment and facilities available for institutional preparedness for fire emergency in a typical Nigerian city, Ibadan. The management of fire disaster was disjointed as post-disaster response and recovery activities were prioritized at the expense of pre-disaster mitigation, prevention, and preparedness measures. This study revealed that the state emergency management agency was more empowered to respond to fire disasters, rather than reducing vulnerabilities to fire disasters through efficient preparedness measures. In other words, more resources were devoted to crisis management (such as search and rescue and aid measures) rather than risk reduction (mitigation and preparedness).

The government channelled more effort and resources to post-fire disaster management while little efforts were focused on fire risk reduction. There was a lack of state investment in long-term vulnerability reduction through structural measures (such as provision of community water supply and hydrants and establishment of more fire stations) and nonstructural measures (such as enforcement of fire safety regulations and creation of public awareness on fire safety). As evident in this study, there was a disjointed and disintegrated approach to fire management. Matters relating to fire risk reduction were domiciled under the OYSEMA, while emergency response to fire disasters was the prerogative of the OSFS. Consequently, management practices in anticipation of fires were weak on the parts of the government, communities, and individuals; and adequate actions were not taken to improve the capacity of communities and institutions to prepare for emergency events. These inadequacies are subject to weak urban governance.