Abstract
I investigate how contractual hours and overtime premiums affect the decision either to moonlight or to work overtime. By reducing the standard workweek, the government or labor unions can affect the likelihood that a worker faces an hour constraint. An underemployed worker can secure additional earnings by working either on a second job or overtime. I model this decision as a bivariate probit. To create variation in the overtime rates, data for nine OECD countries are pooled. I find that decreasing the standard hours of work increases the probability of moonlighting. The overtime premium has an ambiguous effect on the probability of moonlighting, but it has a negative effect on the probability of working overtime.
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I thank R.L. Oaxaca, R. Stratton, and M. Nelson for their valuable comments and help. Any errors are solely my responsibility.
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Renna, F. Moonlighting and overtime: A cross-country analysis. J Labor Res 27, 575–591 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-006-1021-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-006-1021-0