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Who Touched My Mission: Towards Probabilistic Mission Impact Assessment

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Published:12 October 2015Publication History

ABSTRACT

Cyber attacks inevitably generate impacts towards relevant missions. However, concrete methods to accurately evaluate such impacts are rare. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic approach based on Bayesian networks for quantitative mission impact assessment. A System Object Dependency Graph (SODG) is first built to capture the intrusion propagation process at the low operating system level. On top of the SODG, a mission-task-asset (MTA) map can be established to associate the system objects with corresponding tasks and missions. Based on the MTA map, a Bayesian network can be constructed to leverage the collected intrusion evidence and infer the probabilities of tasks and missions being tainted. This approach is promising for effective quantitative mission impact assessment.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      SafeConfig '15: Proceedings of the 2015 Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense
      October 2015
      112 pages
      ISBN:9781450338219
      DOI:10.1145/2809826

      Copyright © 2015 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 12 October 2015

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      SafeConfig '15 Paper Acceptance Rate8of27submissions,30%Overall Acceptance Rate22of61submissions,36%

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