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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Paying the Piper: On the Legal Qualification of Carbon Prices

verfasst von : Tatiana Falcão

Erschienen in: Sustainable Finances and the Law

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

This chapter borrows from the economic and legal interpretation of carbon pricing approaches to identify what types of instruments could, in fact, be characterized as carbon pricing measures meaning an instrument that is capable of capturing the external costs of emitting an additional tonne of carbon by shifting the cost burden from the public to the private consumer. It looks into this topic from two different perspectives, i.e. national and international. The national perspective converses with the essence of the Paris Agreement. These would be the carbon pricing instruments a country could resort to in order to meet its nationally determined contributions (NDCs). At the international level, is the consideration for instruments that are capable not just of conferring a price on carbon but of finding price correspondence with other instruments that might have been administered by other countries. This paper ultimately brings to light the different dimensions of pricing carbon from national and international perspectives. It is expected that the classification and organization of the different instruments according to their ability to price carbon as an externality will assist policy makers not just in meeting their Paris Agreement commitments but also understanding the different instruments that are available to them when devising national mitigation strategies or undergoing environmental fiscal reforms.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Evaluating Additionality Analyses: California Cap and Trade and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

Nächstes Kapitel The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change and Its Main Challenges

The UNFCCC argues that carbon pricing would be referenced in Articles 6.2 (allowing for the linking of carbon pricing approaches across countries, Article 6.4 (foreseeing the creation of a voluntary carbon market that would allow the offsetting of emissions through the trading of emissions reduction units), and Article 6.5 (foreseeing accounting measures to avoid double counting emissions reduction). This author contends that these instruments would not per se qualify as carbon pricing instruments in this article even if they are capable of affecting the price (i.e., reducing or increasing the national carbon price). See in this respect, UNFCCC, About carbon pricing, available at: https://unfccc.int/about-us/regional-collaboration-centres/the-ciaca/about-carbon-pricing#What-is-the-current-status-of-carbon-pricing-in-the.

Parry et al. (2021).

Article 2.1 (a) of the Paris Agreement.

Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement.

Decision 4/CMA.1, annex I contains the rules for the reporting of the information. According to Annex I, the parties must identify reference years, base years, reference periods, or other starting points to measure the baseline. Further, quantifiable information on the reference indicators for comparison with the base year must be included. The target must likewise be expressed numerically, for example, as a percentage or amount of reduction. Parties are requested to include time frames and/or periods for implementation with start and end dates. The information must include a general description of the target (which could be a single-year target or a multi-year target), sectors, gases, categories, and pools. As Minnerop (2019).

UNFCCC, About carbon pricing, available at: https://unfccc.int/about-us/regional-collaboration-centres/the-ciaca/about-carbon-pricing#What-is-the-current-status-of-carbon-pricing-in-th.

Information based on: European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, COM (2021) 564 final, Brussels, 14.7.2021; and Council of the European Union, CBAM: Commission Proposal/Council General Approach/Position of the EP, 13063/22, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13063-2022-INIT/en/pdf.

G7, Terms of Reference for the Climate Club, 12 December 2022.

At the international level, countries are required to compare their pricing approaches to other countries’ approaches and find emissions equivalents for the computation of carbon imbedded in the production of foreign derived products.

The global stocktake is a process whereby “every five years, countries assess collective progress toward the agreement’s long-term goals, considering mitigation, adaptation and finance, as well as equity and the best available science. Each country, informed by this periodic stocktake, is then to submit an updated NDC reflecting a ‘progression’ beyond its current NDC and ‘its highest possible ambition’”. This combination of the GST and NDC updating is known as the ‘ambition cycle.’ Properly executed, the GST process can provide the critical foundation for a regular series of high-level political moments that progressively ratchet up climate ambition.” UNFCCC, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and Energy Defense Fund (2022).

UNFCCC, Technical Dialogues of the first Global Stocktake, available at: https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/components-of-the-gst/technical-dialogues-of-the-first-global-stocktake.

Decision 19/CMA.1 FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, para. 3 establishes the methodology to conduct the technical assessment required to take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement as well as opportunities for enhanced action and support to achieve its goals.

ETSs will derive an explicit carbon price provided the original allowance is auctioned rather than grandfathered. Please refer to Sect. 3.1.2 for further information.

Scott (2015), pp. 92, 93 & 100–102.

UNFCCC, Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, Synthesis Report by the Secretariat, FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8, 4, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_08_adv_1.pdf, (last accessed 4 Jan 2023).

Section 4.2 will cover this latter point more extensively.

OECD (2022). (last accessed 3/1/2023).

Meaning at what stage of the supply chain the tax is levied.

Council of the European Union, CBAM: Commission Proposal/Council General Approach/Position of the EP, 13063/22, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13063-2022-INIT/en/pdf.

Marrakesh Agreement, Appendix, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, art. XX, in WTO (1999), p. 455.

There are currently three versions of the CBAM proposal, i.e., the original version as proposed by the commission, the council position, and the European Parliament position. The original proposal refers loosely to the corresponding adjustment based on the carbon price employed at the country of origin. The council proposal talks about adjustment based on the price effectively paid in the country of origin. Finally, the parliament proposal refers to an adjustment in respect of the explicit carbon price employed in the country of origin. The latter option is likely to be the one adopted as it is consistent with the messaging delivered by the commission in meetings and open consultation processes. The language used in this provision will have important impacts on third states trading with the EU. The commission has yet to adopt implementing acts establishing the methodology to calculate the reduction in the number of CBAM certificates to be surrendered. Council of the European Union, CBAM: Commission Proposal/Council General Approach/Position of the EP, 13063/22, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13063-2022-INIT/en/pdf.

As per Sect. 3.

As per Sect. 4.

OECD (2022).

Black et al. (2022), p. 4. Available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/12/16/A-Framework-for-Comparing-Climate-Mitigation-Policies-Across-Countries-527049.

In the case of ETSs, the internalization only occurs provided the permits are sold or auctioned by the country in question. If the permits are grandfathered in or distributed for free, the price effect of an ETS might only be implicit.

There is extensive literature on the mechanics of a carbon tax. See, for example: Metcalf (2019); IMF (2019b); IMF (2019a), p. 3, available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2019/10/16/Fiscal-Monitor-October-2019-How-to-Mitigate-Climate-Change-47027 (accessed 03 Jan. 2023); Ramseur and Parker (2009), p. 2.

United Nations (2021), Chap. 4, available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/financing/document/un-handbook-carbon-taxation-developing-countries-2021. (last accessed 4 January 2023).

Falcão (2021c), p. 775.

See, in this respect, Kasa (2000).

The grandfathering in of permits is, in fact, one of the biggest obstacles to the effectiveness of an ETS. The European Union, responsible for hosting the longest running ETS scheme in the world, has historically had difficulties in taking the EU ETS through to the next step in which there would be the auctioning off of permits. The market is only a regional one, therefore, the fear is that the full auctioning of permits might impose competitive disadvantages on the European-based industries trading on a worldwide scale. The EU is currently in its Phase 4 of the EU ETS system in which the auctioning of permits is now the default rule, however, the estimate is that only approximately 57% of allowances are, in effect, auctioned. The Fit for 55 plan intends to substitute the grandfathering of permits under the EU ETS for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, hence substituting the instrument used to protect the internal market against carbon leakage.

Based on the practical experience from Chile, China, and the EU.

That is the case, for example, in, Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (when it administered the carbon price floor), and others.

World Bank (2022), p. 13.

OECD (2021). accessed 1 Jan. 2023; OECD (2019). (accessed 25 Jul. 2021); Parry et al. (2014), p. 8, available at https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/books/071/21171-9781484388570-en/21171-9781484388570-en-book.xml (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

For example, Black et al. (2022), p. 4.

The carbon price equivalent measure is the carbon price that would be needed to trigger the same amount of emission reductions of a given policy.

Recent research from the IMF has derived an average corresponding price for fuel taxes of $5–40 per tonne in most cases (and moderately negative in cases where fuels are subsidized) under an economy carbon price equivalent assessment for G20 countries. Black et al. (2022), p. 4.

The IMF and OECD have discussed methodologies for assessing carbon price equivalence of alternative mitigation policies (IMF, OECD (2022), p. 48. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/20179e63-en.pdf?expires=1672949219&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=9D92699C50108E7FD039F083D4627896, last accessed 5 Jan 2023) and for further discussion of the challenges involved see Stern and Lankes (2022).

IMF (2019a) Box 1.3, Operationalizing International Carbon Price Floors.

For example, OECD (2013), p. 23.

See, in this respect, OECD (2022) Table 1.1. A tentative Typology of selected mitigation policies, where feed in tariffs are classified as “other price-based instruments.

UNFCCC, Glasgow Climate Pact, 13 November 2021, available at: https://unfccc.int/documents/310475, last accessed 5 Jan 2023.

World Bank (2022), p. 14.

See Stillwell and Bohanes (2005), ch. 58, 548–549.

IEA (2006). (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

Countries will typically subsidize diesel over gasoline even though diesel is more carbon intensive or subsidize coal over other sources of energy because coal reserves are abundant in the country. Although such measures may be justifiable from a public policy and energy security perspective, they are contradictory to a robust and well-developed environmental policy.

OECD (2019).

WTO, Fossil Fuel Subsidies Reform Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN(17)/54, (12 Dec. 2017), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN17/54.pdf&Open=True (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

Chile; Costa Rica; Iceland; Liechtenstein; Mexico; the Republic of Moldova; New Zealand; Norway; Samoa; Switzerland; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and Uruguay.

WTO, Fossil Fuel Subsidies Reform Ministerial Statement (11 Dec. 2017), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=240841,240845,240847,240848,240824,240821,240788,240773,240787,240774&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=False&HasSpanishRecord=False (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

The statement was led by the Friends of Fossil Fuel subsidy Reform which is an informal group of non-G20 countries established in 2010 to build political consensus on the importance of fossil fuel subsidy reform. See, in this respect: FFFsR, What is the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform, available at http://fffsr.org/ (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

Falcão (2021b), pp. 897–914.

UNEP, IISD, OECD (2019). (accessed 2 Aug 2021).

IEA (2004). (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

The G20 has produced a number of reports on the use and removal of harmful and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies covering countries that employ a carbon tax or price domestically. See, for example: G20 (2017a), A report on the G20 peer-review of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption in Mexico, available at https://www.oecd.org/fossil-fuels/Mexico-Peer-Review.pdf (accessed 25 Jul. 2021); G20 (2017b), A report on the G20 peer-review of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption in Germany, available at http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/Germany-Peer-Review.pdf (accessed 25 Jul. 2021); and G20 (2016), A report on the G20 peer review of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption in China, available at https://www.oecd.org/fossil-fuels/publication/G20%20China%20Peer%20Review_G20_FFS_Review_final_of_20160902.pdf (accessed 25 Jul. 2021).

The Netherlands has run a national campaign to create a methodology to qualify subsidies with the intent to eliminate them. See, in this respect, The Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, HP3 workshop on The Conceptualization and Quantification of Fossil Fuel Subsidies in the Netherlands, 28 October 2021 (author’s files).

A taxonomy is a classification system establishing a list of environmentally sustainable economic activities. The EU was the first region to consider an EU wide taxonomy to meet the targets of the European Green Deal. One of the objectives of the EU taxonomy is to address climate mitigation, although pricing approaches have not yet been contended as part of the framework. See, in this respect, Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of 18 June 2020, on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0852&from=EN (last accessed 6 Jan 2023).

For a discussion of other approaches at EU level, see. Ezcurra et al. (2021), pp. 198–213.

Wolff (2021), pp. 184–197.

For example, In May 2021, Chile published its Taxonomy Roadmap for Chile that will guide the country’s development of a green taxonomy – a multifunctional classification system for financial and nonfinancial sectors that will serve as a blueprint for the greening of Chile’s economy. In Mexico in 2020, the Financial System Stability Council (CESF) created the Sustainable Finance Committee (CFS). The committee’s role was to promote the dialogue toward defining a national taxonomy for sustainable investments that would be aligned with the country’s NDCs and sustainable development goals. Examples taken from Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, Ministries of Finance and Nationally Determined Contributions: Raising Ambitions and Accelerating Climate Action, HP6 Workstream, 29–30, November 2022, available at: https://www.financeministersforclimate.org/sites/cape/files/inline-files/MoFs%20and%20NDCs%20-%20Raising%20Ambition%20and%20Accelerating%20Climate%20Action.pdf (last accessed 6 Jan 2023).

IMF, OECD (2022), p. 9.

IMF, OECD (2022), p. 17.

IMF, OECD (2022), p. 18.

IMF, OECD (2022), p. 9.

Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (2019). Explanatory Notes to the Helsinki Principles, 4, available at: https://www.financeministersforclimate.org/sites/cape/files/inline-files/Explanatory%20Note%20designed%20copy.pdf (last accessed 10 Jan 2023).

IMF (2019a, b), p. 5.

A unilateral measure with the potential to impose a restriction on trade must be nondiscriminatory for it to comply with the GATT and other WTO rules. A measure is considered nondiscriminatory if it is consistent with the main provisions of the GATT—namely, the most-favoured- nation clause in Article I, the national treatment provision in Article III, and quantitative restrictions in Article XI—or is justifiable under one of the Article XX exceptions. If the policy is consistent with Articles I, III, and XI or is justifiable under Article XX, there is no margin for dispute. An explicit carbon price would fall under the Article XX (g) exception of the GATT and would therefore probably be admissible (there is a stronger argument for the acceptability of carbon taxes than there is for the admissibility of ETSs, although they can be considered to be largely comparable provided there is no grandfathering in of permits under the ETS scheme). Equivalence requires that the price employed on the national product and the imported product are similar so that there is no undue burden on the foreign-derived product that might hinder trade.

Falcão (2015), p. 571.

US Senate, Fair, Affordable, Innovative, and Resilient Transition and Competition Act, GAI21718 59G, available at: https://www.coons.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GAI21718.pdf. The proposal suggests that by 1 July 2023, the treasury department would determine the average cost to producers of steel, aluminum, cement, iron, and covered fuels of complying with federal or sub-federal climate policy in effect at the time. In computing the relative baseline environmental cost incurred for each sector, the proposed law foresees that it shall take into account (1) cap and trade and tax measures as well as (2) greenhouse gas emissions standards for passenger cars and light trucks. The question that would arise would thus be whether the computation of efficiency standards would be compatible with WTO law. For the purposes of this proposed act, domestic environmental cost means the sum of the ETS, tax, and GHG emissions efficiency standards for the transport vehicles mentioned above.

Some states in the United States are covered by a carbon price. For example, the American northeast states are covered by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (GGGI), an ETS program covering 11 states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia); California has a cap-and-trade system while California and Washington; and the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia and Quebec are united by the Western Climate Initiative, also an ETS regime.

IRS, Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, available at: https://www.irs.gov/inflation-reduction-act-of-2022 (last accessed 16 Jan 2023).

Some states in the United States are covered by pricing regimes. These are the initiatives in force in the United States: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the California cap and trade system, and the Western Climate Initiative. All of these initiatives are limited to sectoral coverage of emissions.

OECD (2022) Table 1.1. A tentative Typology of selected mitigation policies where feed in tariffs are classified as “other price-based instruments”.

OECD (2022).

Couture et al (2010). See also, Klein et al (2010).

Achieving net zero means that, for every emission released by a country or party, there will be a compensation measure (credit) to offset those emissions. Therefore, net zero does not mean zero emissions as it needs 100% compensation of emissions.

Because the UNFCCC classifies voluntary markets as being equivalent to carbon pricing approaches, it also monitors the use and application of voluntary approaches by the parties of the Paris Agreement. In the UNFCCC, nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, Synthesis Report by the Secretariat, FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8, pg. 5, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_08_adv_1.pdf, (last accessed 4 Jan 2023), the following is reported:

8. Most Parties provided information on voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Almost all of them stated that they plan to or will possibly use at least one type of voluntary cooperation. At the same time, some Parties have set qualitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation for achieving their mitigation targets.

9. Of the Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs, the share that indicated planned or possible use of at least one type of voluntary cooperation has nearly doubled (from 44 to 87 per cent) since their previous NDCs. Similarly, the share of those Parties that have set qualitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation has doubled (from 19 to 39 per cent) since their previous NDCs.

The widespread adoption of the instrument by the Parties of the Paris Agreement heightens the need for the conceptual delimitation of the carbon pricing terminology and deeper assessment of the effect of the application of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

UNFCCC, About carbon pricing, available at: https://unfccc.int/about-us/regional-collaboration-centres/the-ciaca/about-carbon-pricing#What-is-the-current-status-of-carbon-pricing-in-the.

Against, World Bank (2022), p. 13. The World Bank argues that carbon crediting mechanisms there included the system where tradable credits (typically representing a metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent) are generated through voluntarily implemented emission reduction or removal activities and are another form of carbon pricing.

Based on Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, HP3 seminar on Carbon Markets, Organized in cooperation with Global Green Growth Initiative (GGGI), 31 October 2022, author’s files.

WTO, Tariffs, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm#:~:text=Customs%20duties%20on%20merchandise%20imports,they%20raise%20revenues%20for%20governments. (last accessed 12.01.2023).

WTO, Jargon Buster, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/jargon_e.htm#:~:text=non%2Dad%2Dvalorem%20tariff%20A,mixed%E2%80%9D%20or%20some%20other%20form, (last accessed 13 Jan 2023).

WTO, Tariffs: more bindings and closer to zero, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm#con, (last accessed 13 Jan 2023).

Shapiro (2020).

Shapiro (2020), p. 3.

Tarr (2000).

Wiers (2008), p. 22 ss; Quick 2008, p. 164; Pauwelyn (2017), p. 466; see also Moore (2017), p. 49.

For further information on the relationship between Articles II.1 and II.2 of the GATT, see Tatiana and Joachim (2021), 51, 10857, (part 1).

WTO, Environmental Goods Agreement, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm (last accessed 16 Jan 2023).

WTO/GATT, Border Tax Adjustments, Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970, (Doc. L/3464), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.pdf.

Parry, et al. (2021).

McLure (2011), p. 456.

For a complete exposé on the legality of a BCA under WTO rules, see Falcão (2021a, b, c).

See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (1996), available at https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs4.html; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (2006), available at https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol1.html.

WTO/GATT, Border Tax Adjustments, Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970, (Doc. L/3464).

The final language of the proposal is not yet available. This is a compilation by the commission comparing the three versions of the CBAM proposal put forward by the commission, the council and the parliament. The final text is expected to be a compromise of these versions. Council of the European Union, CBAM: Commission Proposal/Council General Approach/Position of the EP, 13063/22, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13063-2022-INIT/en/pdf.

See Taiwan, Climate Change Responses Act, October 21, 2021, Articles 26 and 27. See also Lexology, Carbon Fees and Carbon Tariffs – What Businesses Must Know (Formosan Brothers), April 6, 2022 (author’s files).

100

For a full account of the legality of BCAs in their different forms, see: Falcão and Englisch (2021); Falcão (2021a), p. 485; Falcão 2020, 1047 (specifically on the CBAM).

101

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Titel: Paying the Piper: On the Legal Qualification of Carbon Prices
verfasst von: Tatiana Falcão
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Buch: Sustainable Finances and the Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-49459-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-49460-4

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49460-4_6