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2024 | Buch

The Forgotten Financiers of the Louisiana Purchase

European Bankers, the US, and the Rise of International Finance

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This book provides a comprehensive account of how the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 was financed. Where existing research has focused predominantly on the political and diplomatic significance of the Purchase, this book demonstrates the importance of the Purchase to global financial history.

The book provides context and background for the Louisiana Purchase and examines the role of key actors and companies, focusing particularly on the ‘forgotten financiers’ of the Purchase – individuals from the US, France and the UK including Alexander Baring, Albert Gallatin, Pierre Cesar Labouchere and Francois Barbe-Marbois. Based on extensive, original archival research, the chapters will illuminate the role played by these individuals in bringing about financial innovation and facilitating a major transaction that doubled the size of the original United States and helped set the country on a path to global power. The book will be a valuable resource for historians of Europe and America, particularly those with interests in economic and financial history, as well as banking and finance scholars who are interested in the emergence of large-scale international finance in the 19th century.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Behind the Scenes of the Louisiana Purchase
Abstract
“The Louisiana Purchase” refers to the 1803 cession by France to the United States of its right of pre-emption over the area of North America that it had claimed against other European powers before 1763, a right it had ceded to Spain in that year. For $15 million paid by the United States, France ceded the area it had re-claimed from Spain two years previously (Treaty of San Ildefonso) to the new country, doubling its area. The “greatest land deal in history” was done by the respective political leaders, Napoleon and Jefferson, who, with their respective agents, are prominently featured in all subsequent histories. Left behind the scenes are the financial actors, the men who arranged the financing and carried it to completion through the following years. They met the challenges of renewed war, including between the United States and Britain, and the resulting restrictions on international trade and finance, to emerge as leaders in the continued rise of international finance.
Larry Neal
Chapter 2. Setting Up the Finance for the Louisiana Purchase
Abstract
Beginning in January 1803, Alexander Baring and Pierre Cesar Labouchere developed provisional plans for financing the French payment of claims by American merchants, left unsettled from the Treaty of Mortefontaine, while also financing the American payment to France for New Orleans, due to be transferred from Spain to France later that year. Pierre emphasized the importance of keeping the financial arrangements by each country with the houses of Baring and Hope, rather than with each other directly. Further, he proposed “greasing the wheels” by bribing key “influencers” from both countries to keep the entire bargain under the control of Baring and Hope. Alexander received much advice from Pierre as well as from Sir Francis Baring and Henry Hope, but was left to make the final arrangements on his own. These proved to be successful, helped by Sir Francis obtaining management in London of all U.S. government payments in Britain and Europe and Pierre Cesar obtaining partnership with two leading merchant banking firms in Amsterdam for marketing U.S. bonds there. The three conventions that comprised the Louisiana Purchase were officially enacted, first in France and then in the United States, do not mention the private contract between Alexander Baring and the three government ministers, the most important one for the finance of the Louisiana Purchase. This contract conferred all the rights of the French government over the U.S. bonds to Alexander Baring with power of attorney from Francis Baring & Co. of London and Hope & Co. of Amsterdam. In turn, Alexander signed to accept 92 individual bills of exchange payable to France in weekly amounts summing to 52 million francs (reserving 8 millions as commission).
Larry Neal
Chapter 3. “The Present Order of Things” in January 1803
Abstract
The various contracts signed in Paris and the United States for financing the Louisiana Purchase occurred during the “Truce of Amiens,” from October 1, 1801 to May 18, 1803. The suspension of hostilities permitted the movement of individuals, political and private, to resume between Britain and the Continent, especially the merchant bankers involved in international finance. The Truce also allowed Napoleon to launch his ill-fated invasion of Haiti in order to re-establish prosperous sugar plantations, which depended on restoring slave labor. When that failed, Napoleon decided to yield to the American demand to buy New Orleans but raise the price by including all of the Louisiana Territory. He knew from his advisors, Mollien and Barbé-Marbois, the success of the British financial revolution and the ongoing success of the American financial revolution. Barings had experienced the benefit of Alexander Hamilton’s restoration of American public credit through the efforts of Daniel Parker, even though a tontine designed to interest British investors in American sovereign debt proved unworkable in London. Meanwhile, Alexander dealt with Gallatin in the United States and Labouchere with Talleyrand in Paris and Dutch competitors in Amsterdam.
Larry Neal
Chapter 4. Baring & Hope Anticipate Financing the Louisiana Purchase
Abstract
Labouchere’s letter of January 30, 1803 to Alexander Baring explains in detail how the financing of the cession of New Orleans from France to America could be done by the two houses of Baring & Hope. They would deal separately with each country as private firms. To “grease the wheels,” moreover, bribes would be paid to key individuals in each government. Profits would be substantial, but approval had to be obtained from Sir Francis Baring and Henry Hope in London before Alexander could move ahead. Once negotiations began in Paris, however, Alexander had to act on his own, but with the benefit of additional advice and notes from both Labouchere and Sir Francis. The ultimate deal was different, however, in several respects. The scale of financing was doubled as the entire Louisiana Territory was now ceded, not just New Orleans and the Floridas. Further, the United States accepted the payment directly to its merchants for their claims on French privateers, leaving Baring & Hope dealing only with the U.S. bonds issued to cover payments to France. Clearly, Alexander had negotiated brilliantly to obtain the joint agreement of the French and American ministers to confide the entire transaction to him as the agent of the joint houses of Baring & Hope.
Larry Neal
Chapter 5. All the Players Were Important
Abstract
The background of the financial players in the Louisiana Purchase begins with François Barbé-Marbois, whose enthusiasm for the independent republic of the United States of America began with his diplomatic service for France as representative during the final years of the War of Independence. His sojourn in the United States overlapped with that of Albert Gallatin, destined to become the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury under Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Alexander Baring came to the United States in 1795, ostensibly to oversee the purchase of lands in Maine for Baring & Hope, but devoted most of his time to investing in U.S. government debt and the stock of the First Bank of the United States. In 1798, he became a son-in-law of William Bingham, Senator from Pennsylvania. Bingham was the son-in-law of Thomas Willing, President of the Bank of the United States and hosted eminent visitors from Europe, including Talleyrand. Labouchere fled Amsterdam with Alexander in winter 1794, to serve Henry Hope in London. In the meantime, he married the oldest daughter of Sir Francis, becoming brother-in-law to Alexander. When the Peace of Amiens occurred, Labouchere was sent to Amsterdam to re-open the firm of Hope & Co., but first went to Lisbon to arrange a Portuguese loan backed by a monopoly on diamonds exported from Brazil, which would enable payment of tribute to Napoleon. In sum, Alexander established firm working relationships with Albert Gallatin in the United States and Pierre with Talleyrand and Barbé-Marbois in Paris.
Larry Neal
Chapter 6. Daniel Parker, Expatriate Extraordinaire
Abstract
Parker left the United States in the late summer of 1784, under a cloud of suspicion from his partners in the United States, but with a good reputation from George Washington and John Adams. Arranging profitable speculation on U.S. securities with Dutch merchant bankers, he ended up establishing good relations with Sir Francis Baring, while moving between Amsterdam, Paris, and London. In Paris, he joined a partnership with Joel Barlow and made a fortune for both of them by arranging shipping of goods from the West Indies to revolutionary France with American ships. Insight into his operations is found in the Baring Archive, which deals with the fate of a U.S. ship, the Rosanna, whose rich cargo from Surinam was seized by French privateers. It became one of the claims against France under the terms of the Louisiana Purchase. Parker earlier had invested proceeds of his shipments to France in purchasing country estates seized by French nobles and, eventually the Paris mansion of the Comte de Montmorin. Shortly after the conclusion of the Louisiana Purchase, Parker also purchased the fabulous Chateau de Draveil on the outskirts of Paris. He sold it in 1821, probably to pay off claims of John Holker, his earlier partner in supplying Washington’s armies during the Revolution. Nevertheless, he needs to be given credit for promoting the Louisiana Purchase to Sir Francis and the American ministers in Paris.
Larry Neal
Chapter 7. The Deal Is Done, But Problems Arise Everywhere: America, London, Paris, and Amsterdam
Contrary to the standard histories that take the finance of the Louisiana Purchase as easily done, problems arose for Alexander Baring and Pierre Cesar Labouchere in each of the four locations involved: America, where the form and number of certificates to be created and sent back with Alexander, conforming to the instructions from his father, are contested by Gallatin; in London, Sir Francis is ordered by the British Prime Minister to cease and desist from further remittances on behalf of the United States to Paris, given war has been declared; in Paris, Napoleon insists upon a large advance payment from the bankers, which Baring does on the advice of Monroe, over the objection of Livingston, but Labouchere covers the remaining obligations by replacing Alexander’s undated acceptances with alternative commitments by Hope & Co. in Amsterdam. There, Labouchere claimed 2/3 of the profits from the sale of the Louisiana bonds that have arrived safely in Europe. This led to Sir Francis revealing much of the background to the financing to make good his claim for ½ of the profits, reducing Labouchere’s share.
Larry Neal
Chapter 8. Meanwhile, More Trouble Back in Paris
Abstract
François Barbé-Marbois encounters problems meeting Napoleon’s demands for money to continue paying his troops stationed in Boulogne for the intended invasion of Britain in 1805. He relies on the company of French military suppliers, the Négociants Réunis, to make good their claims on the newly chartered Banque de France, despite Spain’s failure to supply its agreed tribute. A general banking crisis occurs in Paris. Napoleon then reverses his army from invading Britain to attack Austria. His victory at Austerlitz and occupation of Vienna seals his role as Emperor. On his return to Paris in January 1806, he removes Barbé-Marbois from office and replaces him with Nicolas Mollien. Napoleon also places under arrest the leading French military supplier, Gabriel Ouvrard, but who gains his temporary freedom by promising to use Baring & Hope to regain access to Spain’s silver money located at the mint in Mexico. Labouchere, disappointed at losing part of the Louisiana profits, takes up Ouvrard’s claims on Mexico to organize the import of Mexican silver to both London and Amsterdam via neutral American ships. He sets up David Parish in Philadelphia to organize the scheme, Vincent Nolte in New Orleans to intermediate, and Armand Lestapis in Vera Cruz to convert Ouvrard’s claims into silver pesos for export to the United States and Europe. The sums gained by Baring & Hope from the Mexican silver scheme exceeded by far those from the Louisiana Purchase, which had laid the basis for the larger adventure.
Larry Neal
Chapter 9. The Financial & Personal Crises of 1810–1811
Abstract
The general European financial crisis of 1810–1811 occurred while first Sir Francis Baring died (September 11, 1810) and then Henry Hope (February 25, 1811). Thereafter, Alexander had to assume leadership of the Baring firm, re-organized in 1805 as Baring Bros., and Pierre had to re-consider his role in Hope & Co. in Amsterdam. While Alexander paid increasing attention to his political career in the House of Commons, Pierre announced his resignation from Hope & Co., given the change in the political role of the Netherlands, from a Kingdom under Louis Napoleon to a part of the French Empire as a Vice-royalty. Alexander was able to use the resources mobilized for the Mexican silver scheme to provide needed support to Wellington’s Peninsular Army, laying the basis for his rapport with Wellington after Waterloo. His well-reasoned arguments against the British Orders in Council, however, were dismissed given the obvious interests of Baring Bros. for continued American commerce. Pierre Labouchere, after a failed diplomatic mission to England in 1810, was able to give needed financial support to Czar Alexander in his upcoming war against Napoleon. Before retiring with his family to England, he visited the main banking houses in Austria, Russian, and Prussia, contacts that would be important after Waterloo.
Larry Neal
Chapter 10. The War of 1812 and the Financiers of the Louisiana Purchase
Abstract
After returning to Europe to share in the profits from the Mexican silver scheme, Vincent Nolte and David Parish, the agents that Labouchere had sent abroad originally, ignored his offers of employment in Europe to return to the U.S.—Nolte to New Orleans to set up as a cotton factor for the emerging trade with Europe and Parish to Philadelphia to develop land in northern New York state. They arrived in time for the start of the War of 1812, which disrupted their optimistic plans, but which enabled both to engage in large-scale smuggling activities. While these undercut Gallatin’s collection of revenues, they did enable continued payment of interest on the Louisiana bonds. Nolte’s cotton bales, set up for illegal export in late 1814, were seized by Andrew Jackson to stabilize the cannons he set up on the levee south of New Orleans, a critical element in Jackson’s victory. Parish’s trade on the St. Lawrence was kept out of military action thanks to his role in underwriting the largest war-time loan to the United States, jointly with Stephen Girard and John Jacob Astor. All three financiers had active accounts with both Baring and Hope, but Barings’ role was limited to covering shortfalls in U.S. payments of interest on the Louisiana bonds, while charging the U.S. account annual interest at 5%.
Larry Neal
Chapter 11. Lessons Learned, Applied, and Ignored
Abstract
The first lesson learned and applied was to establish the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, since the absence of the First Bank of the United States after its charter was not renewed in 1811 severely hampered Gallatin’s attempts to raise domestic taxes to cover regular government expenditure or to raise new loans to cover the additional expenses of war. The new bank, however, had problems to establish itself, especially to obtain specie reserves to make its notes convertible. All this while the Bank of England was pulling in specie in anticipation of returning to the pre-war gold standard in 1819–1821. Again, Barings provided re-cycling of much of the funds used to redeem the Louisiana bonds in this period to invest in Bank of the U.S. stock, but also to set up financing of the French occupation loans in 1817–1819. Both Alexander and Pierre played leadership roles in arranging the much larger French loans, denominated in French francs with interest paid in Paris. Alexander had to deal with the Duke of Wellington for setting terms of payment to the occupying foreign armies and with Nicholas Vansittart, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, for coping with the resumption of the gold standard by the Bank of England. While Alexander performed brilliantly with the British military and political leaders, Pierre motivated the various French and European banking houses to participate as well in the French occupation loan. The question remains why their important roles in these major financial transactions have been overlooked in the historical literature.
Larry Neal
Chapter 12. Curtain Call: All the Players Should Take a Bow
Abstract
The main reason the historical literature has overlooked the important roles played by these two financiers during this historic period of transformation of international finance is likely because neither man wrote about it explicitly. Both had to deal with tenuous political environments: Alexander in Britain because of his obvious attachment to the economic interests of the United States, which discredited him in the eyes of the war-hawks in Britain, first because of the apparent financial support to Napoleon, and then because of the War of 1812 and the general popular enthusiasm of the British public to defeat the U.S. Pierre in Amsterdam had to deal with the frequently changing political tides in the Netherlands from 1787 to 1815, which led him to spend the remainder of his life as a country squire in England. Gallatin and Barbé-Marbois lived on to write substantial works afterward, but Gallatin’s were on the ethnography of Native Americans, after vainly defending, once again, the re-chartering of the Bank of the United States. Barbé-Marbois’s attention was focused more on the continuing efforts of while planters to regain control of Haiti, and it was only at the end of his life that he allowed an American translation of his History of Louisiana to appear. Vincent Nolte lived on to write a fascinating memoir after surviving several duels in New Orleans, but failed ultimately in the last crisis of 1837. David Parish, after losing out to the Rothschilds in the re-financing of Austrian finances after Waterloo, committed suicide by drowning in the Danube. Alexander and Pierre, prospering in their respective country estates in England, should be recognized now as successful pioneers in the development of international finance, based on marketable sovereign debt.
Larry Neal
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
The Forgotten Financiers of the Louisiana Purchase
verfasst von
Larry Neal
Copyright-Jahr
2024
Electronic ISBN
978-3-031-56277-8
Print ISBN
978-3-031-56276-1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56277-8