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2022 | Buch

The New Bail-In Legislation

An Analysis of European Banking Resolution

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Financial stability is a pillar of well-functioning financial markets. After the last financial crisis, European policymakers harmonised banking regulation and revised the framework of banking resolution. The introduction of the bail-in legislation is a natural experiment to improve the understanding of banking resolution and how it affected the funding strategies of banks. This book assesses whether financial stability has been strengthened by the change in banks’ resolution policy with a focus on the bail-in. The book shows how banks changed their funding strategies, shrank their balance-sheets and relied more on deposits. The book will discuss inter-alia the mis-selling of bonds, which happened during 2012-2013, analysing whether the bond allocation changed after the bail-in launch. It discusses how the bail-in mechanism was deemed credible by equity holders and argues that the European case would have useful implications for third countries. Finally, the book relates this discussion to the possible collateral effects generated by the new resolution policy during and after the COVID-19 crisis, which will be of particular interest to researchers and policymakers in banking and financial institutions. ​

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. The New Bank Resolution Framework
Abstract
Since the global financial crisis, the European banking industry has experienced great turmoil. European policymakers have implemented a harmonized and enhanced European banking union based on three pillars—supervision (via the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism), resolution (via the creation of the Single Resolution Board and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive), and deposit insurance. This chapter focuses on the second pillar that introduced the bail-in tool. This tool, introduced with the Bank Recovery Resolution Directive, aims at fostering an orderly and harmonized crisis management in European countries. This chapter highlights the economic mechanisms at work including the possible unintended consequences caused by the change in resolution policy. These include inter alia, political economy hurdles on the implementation, the possibility of runs, and miss-selling.
Angela Maria Maddaloni, Giulia Scardozzi
Chapter 2. Bank Funding Strategies After Bail-in Announcement
Abstract
The introduction of the bail-in might have induced a radical change in the funding strategy of banks. Changes in the legal protection of funding instruments can have implications for the cost and composition of banks’ liabilities. In particular, the introduction of the bail-in mechanism implies an increase in the credit risk of banks’ bondholders. Empirical evidence shows that, after the launch of the bail-in mechanism, banks privileged funding via customer deposits—the cheapest source of funding. This may enhance the liquidity risk due to asset-liability mismatch as customer deposits are the source of funding with the shortest maturity.
Angela Maria Maddaloni, Giulia Scardozzi
Chapter 3. Risk Allocation and Bond Mis-selling After the Bail-in Directive
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the holding of bail-inable securities. During 2012–2013, several cases of mis-selling occurred in European countries as banks sold risky bonds to retail investors as “safe assets.” The chapter shows how bond holdings across different types of investors has evolved in recent times. Before the approval of the new resolution regime, the mis-selling was a widespread financial phenomenon, especially in Southern Euro Area countries. However, allocation of bonds across sectors changed after the launch of the bail-in resolution mechanism; households sold their bank bonds to other, more sophisticated, financial intermediaries. This suggests that the new European Resolution mechanism was effective in reducing the mis-selling of bank bonds.
Angela Maria Maddaloni, Giulia Scardozzi
Chapter 4. Bond Allocation After Bank Resolution Cases
Abstract
Investors may not react to the approval of the regulation (as analyzed by the previous chapter) and may not realize the inherent risk in certain instruments (e.g. bail-inable bonds) until banks are actually experiencing distress. In 2017, several distressed banks that had issued bail-inable debt were actually resolved. Case studies of the major resolution events are discussed in this chapter (e.g. Banco Popular, the Italian “Venetian Banks,” and Monte dei Paschi di Siena). Evidence is provided on the implications of the implementation of the bail-in; results suggest that the banking sector in aggregate increased the nominal amount held of bail-inable bonds issued by riskier banks relative to safer banks (possibly impairing financial stability by increasing the risk of contagion in case of a bank failure), whereas other financial institutions decreased their holdings.
Angela Maria Maddaloni, Giulia Scardozzi
Chapter 5. Market Reactions to Resolution Events
Abstract
The long period (from 2011 to 2019) wherein several instances of bank resolution resulted in bailout or bail-in allows to analyze how financial markets reacted. Using this relatively long time span and the different resolution events, a comparison of market reactions can be made according to the type of the event (e.g. bailout and bail-in) and the uncertainty surrounding its implementation. We analyzed the abnormal stock prices returns through event studies. The analysis shows a negative impact on the stock price returns following resolution cases regardless of the resolution mechanism implemented. The financial market reacts negatively when the resolution is undertaken within a bailout framework, but the reaction is smaller in absolute value when compared with bail-in resolution cases. However, after the formal approval of the bail-in regulation, investors began to react less negatively to bail-in resolution cases than to bailouts.
Angela Maria Maddaloni, Giulia Scardozzi
Chapter 6. Conclusion
Abstract
The change in bank resolution policy in Europe generated some “unintended” consequences on the financial system with both positive and negative connotations. The new European banking resolution regime fosters financial stability by increasing the banking sector’s resilience, necessary to withstand the occurrence of strong exogenous shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic. In this manuscript, we review some of the consequences of the transition from a bailout to bail-in resolution. We observe, firstly, a change in the bank liability mix toward cheaper sources of funding (such as customer deposits). Then, we analyze the reallocation of banks’ bonds holdings; before the approval of the new resolution regulation, mis-selling of risky bank bond was widespread, but after the implementation of the bail-in mechanism, there was a reallocation of bank bonds toward more sophisticated financial intermediaries. Finally, we analyze the market reactions at the bank resolution events.
Angela Maria Maddaloni, Giulia Scardozzi
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
The New Bail-In Legislation
verfasst von
Dr. Angela Maria Maddaloni
Giulia Scardozzi
Copyright-Jahr
2022
Electronic ISBN
978-3-030-87560-2
Print ISBN
978-3-030-87559-6
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87560-2