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Erschienen in:
Issues and Prospects of Valuation Science Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

The Tip and the Bottom. What Makes an Estimate True?

verfasst von : Stefano Caputo

Erschienen in: Science of Valuations

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

In this chapter some basic notions and recent developments in the theories of judgement and truth will be applied, as a case study, to real estate estimates in order to answer the following questions: are they descriptive or evaluative judgements? Is their truth absolute or relative to some parameters? Is their truth a matter of correspondence with objective, mind-independent facts or is it a matter of coherence with some mind-dependent standards (in the broad sense of “mind-dependent” which includes cultural and social standards)? The answers to these questions will show that real estate estimates are an interesting borderline case between descriptive and evaluative judgements, absolute and relative truth, correspondence with an objective reality and coherence with mind-dependent standards.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Inextricability of Fact and Value
Nächstes Kapitel Evaluating Valuations: The Case of Happiness as Oikeiosis
Fußnoten
1
There are however exceptions to the truth-aptness of descriptive sentences: for instance it has been claimed that sentences in which so-called “vague” predicates (e.g. “bald”, “rich”) are applied to borderline cases, such as “Carlo is bald” (with Carlo being an individual with just a few hairs on his head) are neither true nor false; similarly it has been claimed (since Aristotle) that sentences concerning future contingent events, such as “By June 2021 a vaccine against Covid-19 will be available” are neither true nor false before the time they point to has come.
 
2
Strictly speaking this is true only of what can be called “fully determinate judgements”, that is to say those whose content represents a specific possible state of the world which obtains or does not obtain; so for instance whereas “It’s raining in Turin on 10-1-2020 at 9 o’clock” is a fully determinate judgment, “It’s raining” is not such, since in order to evaluate its truth, it must be specified where and when rain is said to be falling. Notice that if a distinction is made between sentences and judgements (intended as what is believed in uttering sentences) it can be claimed, as many philosophers do, that judgements are always fully determinate, since believing something involves the commitment to its truth, so what is believed must be truth-evaluable and, therefore, fully determinate. However, since this distinction between sentences and judgments is note relevant for what follows I will use the two terms interchangeably.
 
3
In a still weaker sense we sometimes use locutions such as “This is true for me but not for you” to mean “I believe that this is true and you don’t”.
 
4
The correspondence theory of truth originates in the work of Aristotle (Metaphysics, IX, 1051b 1–5) and was explicitly formulated for the first time by Thomas Aquinas who defined truth as “Adaequatio intellectus et rei” (Summa contra Gentiles, I, 59). The versions of the theory which introduce facts as the entities to which true propositions correspond are due, at the beginning of the XX century, to Moore [18], Russell [24] and Wittgenstein [29].
 
5
This is the core idea of the so called Frege-Geach argument against moral expressivism [9], the philosophical view, to which I will shortly return, according to which moral sentences are not truth-apt, since they serve only to express emotive reactions or prescriptions and have therefore no descriptive content.
 
6
The queerness of, say, moral facts consists in that they should have as constituents moral properties, such as the property of being right/good, which many (although not all) philosophers have considered irreducible to natural properties.
 
7
Starting from the Seventies onward so called Deflationism gained the centre of the philosophical stage thanks to the works of philosophers such as Quine [22], Grover, Kamp and Belnap [10], Field [7, 6], Horwich [11].
 
8
For an overview of Alethic Pluralism see Pedersen, Wright (2012, 2013).
 
9
For an overview of the debate on truth-relativism see Garcìa-Carpintero and Kölbel [8].
 
10
“$” is a placeholder for a specific monetary value.
 
11
Truth-makers theory, which took its start by the seminal works of Mulligan, Simons, Smith (1984) is an important brand of contemporary metaphysics and theory of truth.
 
12
For an overview see Appraisal Institute [1]. I’m grateful to Salvatore Giuffrida for having kindly and patiently taught me some basic notions of Real Estate Estimate.
 
13
See footnote 2.
 
14
Here the mind-independence and objectivity of such facts must be understood not as the property of existing independently of the existence of any mind (clearly no minds no prices) but as the property of obtaining or not obtaining independently of the beliefs and desires of people making judgments on the matter: no matter what Arthur desires concerning the price of his flat, this price is what it is given the relevant price-determining facts.
 
15
Of course not all the facts making an estimate true are socially construed and values-dependent; for instance the surface area or the brightness of flat are not such.
 
16
This contribution is part of the research project “Semantic and Ontological Perspectives on the Theory of Truth: Deflationism, Pluralism and Grounding” funded by the “Fondo di Ateneo per la Ricerca 2019” (“University Fund for Research 2019”) of the University of Sassari.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The Tip and the Bottom. What Makes an Estimate True?
verfasst von
Stefano Caputo
Copyright-Jahr
2024
Buch
Science of Valuations

Print ISBN: 978-3-031-53708-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-53709-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2024

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53709-7_5