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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. Conspiracy Ideation and Populism

verfasst von : Valerio Pellegrini, Mauro Giacomantonio, Luigi Leone

Erschienen in: Political Psychology Perspectives on Populism

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

Worldviews characterizing conspiracy theories and populism present similar core beliefs suggesting shared psychological features. Both are expressed through simplified narratives with two morally well-defined sides. Populism articulates narratives implying stark oppositions of internally homogeneous groups (“People” and “élite”) and a Manichean view of these groups (élite = evil). Conspiracy ideation is defined as a general propensity to explain impactful geopolitical events through conspiracy theories, concocted by malevolent élites to the detriment of ordinary people. The present chapter provides a literature review highlighting that individual endorsement of populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs emerge as psychological responses to threatened basic needs. Both conspiracist and populist narratives offer the alienated masses a renewed sense of certainty and control over reality, self-or-ingroup image. Furthermore, the chapter reports empirical findings about links between conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes with ideological belief systems such as system justification, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism. Results show positive associations of both phenomena with authoritarianism, weak or lacking associations with social dominance orientation, and negative robust relations with system-justifying tendencies. Overall, the chapter provides an integrated perspective of the shared psychosocial roots of the endorsement of political populism and conspiracy beliefs and moves around their potential applied implications.

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Vorheriges Kapitel COVID-19 Threat and Populism: The Mediation Effect of Epistemic and Significance Motivations

Nächstes Kapitel Populist Thin Ideology: From a Theoretical Conceptualisation to the Development of a New Scale

Virtue and honesty were key ideals for Rousseau and for the French revolution: virtue and honesty stem from the fusion of self-love with love of county, and identification with the General Will.

The notion of a homogeneous people pursuing the general will has of course its roots in Rousseau. In Rousseau’s view the primitive self-love (amour de soi) and the more elevated sympathy (pitié) fuse together in the virtuous. Differently put, in the virtuous self-love and love of others coincide and thus distinctions within the people dissolve altogether (Taylor, 2007).

Some scholars advanced that the adoption of conspiracy beliefs would derive from basic psychological mechanisms (e.g., the cognitive ability to create patterns) that have developed during human evolution, resulting in evolutionary advantages (see van Prooijen & Van Vugt, 2018 for a detailed discussion).

Within a network, observed variables are framed as nodes, and their interplay is quantified through edges representing statistical relationships. In this chapter, the edges between nodes (e.g., SDO, RWA, SJ, etc.) were expressed in terms of partial correlations. An edge between two nodes expressed as a partial correlation indicates conditional dependence between the nodes. Conversely, when two nodes are not linked, they are conditionally independent given all other nodes in the network and thus cannot interact directly.

Network models involving partial correlations are based on the principles of specificity and sensitivity. Increasing the model’s specificity reduces the edges between nodes, while, increasing the sensitivity makes the model less parsimonious. The EBICglasso method find a balance between specificity and sensitivity by estimating models iteratively and selecting the most informative one.

NCT investigates the presence of potential global and local differences between two networks. Global differences are quantified by testing the invariance of network structure (i.e., M test statistic) and of global strength (i.e., S test statistic). Local differences are quantified by testing the invariance of edge strength (i.e., E test statistic).

Elites are equated in the populist imaginary with self-interest, which is in turn a sign of corruption, which in turn is by itself a threat to the virtuous. The corrupt elite would turn to plotting in order to sabotage the General Will. This dynamic connecting the belief of embodying the General Will and the vigilance against conspirators and saboteurs has been repeatedly realized in history, for instance during Robespierre’s Terror, and in the internal convulsions of 1930’s bolshevism (Taylor, 2007).

It has been noted that both fascism and communism could be interpreted as reactions against the anomie and the social upheavals stemming from World War I and the mismanagement of the Great Depression (DeLong, 2022; Polanyi, 1944/2001).

Of course, nostalgia for political orders past is not unique to populist anti-establishment movements. Western elites in charge in the 1920s (President Hoover in the USA, Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s) wished to roll back the social and economic changes imposed by World War I and go back to the Liberal classical order pre 1914 (balanced budgets, the gold standard) (DeLong, 2022).

Incidentally, Marx and Engels considered this a positive and progressive social and cultural achievement of the capitalist bourgeoisie (e.g., Berman, 1983).

Reactionary revolutions are not unique to populism’s political imaginary. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 was indeed presented as a return the righteous status quo ante. Similarly, the American colonists wanted their traditional “rights of Englishmen” restored. In history, new social and political phenomena have been frequently established by revolutionary forces mainly mobilized on the basis of backward-looking ideals of legitimacy (Taylor, 2007).

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Titel: Conspiracy Ideation and Populism
verfasst von: Valerio Pellegrini
Mauro Giacomantonio
Luigi Leone
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Buch: Political Psychology Perspectives on Populism
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-44072-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-44073-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44073-1_5