Political Psychology Perspectives on Populism

This chapter introduces the Intergroup model of the populist mentality (IMPM) and offers a cross-national analysis of the internal structure of populist representations. Inspired by social representations theory, we argue that populism is best understood as a multidimensional representation of the intergroup relation between the “people” as the ingroup and the “elite” as an outgroup. This representation is organized around the conflict between a majority group (the people) and a minority group (the elite). The intergroup comparison between the people-majority and the elite-minority is based on power (vertical differentiation in terms of an intergroup competition between a powerless people and a powerful elite) and morality (horizontal differentiation in terms of alleged moral superiority of the people compared to an immoral elite). Through this dialectic antagonism of the people-elite dualism, the elite is simultaneously inferior (horizontal differentiation) and superior (vertical differentiation) to the people. The IMPM identifies four populist subdimensions: two pro-majority dimensions centered on positive views of the people (people-centrism): people sovereignty and people-homogeneity, and two anti-minority dimensions centered on negative views of the elite (anti-elitism): elite distance and elite homogeneity.

We further argue that there is a structural homology between populist beliefs focused on the people and generic pro-majority representations, and, conversely, between populist anti-elite beliefs and generic anti-minority representations. We test this idea by examining how populist subdimensions are associated with various correlates of populist thinking such as institutional and social (dis)trust, SDO, and authoritarianism. The results support our conjecture as pro-majority attitudes are positively associated with people sovereignty, whereas anti-minority beliefs mostly relate to anti-elitism, thus further highlighting the necessity of distinguishing the internal components of populism. Finally, we differentiate inclusionary-exclusionary and egalitarian-inegalitarian versions of populism and find that while both anti-elitism and people sovereignty were associated with calls for a higher levels of pro-welfare attitudes, anti-elitism plays a much stronger part in the formation of exclusionary (anti-immigrant) versions of populism.

Overall, our chapter offers a new and more nuanced view of the internal structure of populist representations that allows to establish the similarities and dissimilarities of populist thinking across national contexts, as well as national specificities.

In this work, we analyze the root causes of support for populism through a motivational lens. We propose that threats elicited in periods of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to increase the support for populist attitudes through three motivational processes: the need for personal significance (Kruglanski et al., Perspectives on Psychological Science 17:1050–1071, 2022), the need for collective significance (Kruglanski et al., American Psychologist 68:559–575, 2013; Jasko et al., Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118:1165–1187, 2020), and the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, Psychological Review, 103(2):263–283, 1996). These motivations can be activated in several circumstances. For example, the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic can induce a sense of uncertainty about the circumstance surrounding the event, which leads individuals to search for clarity and responses. The threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic can also undermine the sense of self-certainty and group-certainty, which induces individuals to search for self-affirming means such as strongly identifying with relevant social groups and subscribing to identity-defining self (Hogg et al., 2010). Polarized ideological platforms that offer certainty and simplicity as well as self-affirming means are particularly suited to address these needs. Accordingly, partially building on the results obtained in two studies, one conducted at the beginning of the pandemic (Spring 2020), and one a year into the pandemic (Spring 2021) in Italy (Study 1, n = 2010; Study 2, n = 1837), we argue that populist narratives play two functions. First, their clear-cut and dichotomous core that draws a line between good and evil is certainty-promoting and thus appealing to those seeking closure. Second, populist narratives promise empowerment, social recognition, and dignity by providing significance-bestowing values to pursue, such as fighting various alleged enemies of the ‘people’. According to this argument, the results showed that the relation between the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and populist attitudes was mediated by epistemic and significance-affirming motivations (i.e., personal and collective need for significance). Specifically, we found that the higher the perceived COVID-19 threat, the higher the need for cognitive closure, the quest for individual significance, and the quest for collective significance. These motivational forces, in turn, were positively related to populist attitudes.

Worldviews characterizing conspiracy theories and populism present similar core beliefs suggesting shared psychological features. Both are expressed through simplified narratives with two morally well-defined sides. Populism articulates narratives implying stark oppositions of internally homogeneous groups (“People” and “élite”) and a Manichean view of these groups (élite = evil). Conspiracy ideation is defined as a general propensity to explain impactful geopolitical events through conspiracy theories, concocted by malevolent élites to the detriment of ordinary people. The present chapter provides a literature review highlighting that individual endorsement of populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs emerge as psychological responses to threatened basic needs. Both conspiracist and populist narratives offer the alienated masses a renewed sense of certainty and control over reality, self-or-ingroup image. Furthermore, the chapter reports empirical findings about links between conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes with ideological belief systems such as system justification, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism. Results show positive associations of both phenomena with authoritarianism, weak or lacking associations with social dominance orientation, and negative robust relations with system-justifying tendencies. Overall, the chapter provides an integrated perspective of the shared psychosocial roots of the endorsement of political populism and conspiracy beliefs and moves around their potential applied implications.

Populism is characterized by the coexistence of antithetical categories that create a contrast between the people and institutions and between the people and ‘others’ (e.g., elites or other outgroups). This polarization is built on dynamics linked to the valorization of the ingroup seen as pure, good, and honest people—and to the stigmatization of the outgroup, politics in general, and corrupt elites—seen as bad, immoral, and harmful to the people. The present work explores this polarization through the representations of populism, pandemic, and war constructed by Italian citizens of different political orientations over four years (2019–2022). Our research is framed on the theoretical tradition of social representations (SR), which privileges free associations to study representations’ most profound and unconscious aspects. To retrieve these social representations, we used five stimulus words (S-Ws) linked to populism—PEOPLE, LEADER, ELITE, PARTY, POLITICS—three to the pandemic—COVID, NATURE, SCIENCE—and two to the Russian-Ukrainian war—PEACE, and WAR. Our analyses were synchronic (on the associations of the voters of four parties, regardless of the year) and diachronic (on the associations of the voters of four parties in the four years). Based on the literature and previous empirical investigations, we formulated some research questions for the synchronic analysis and conducted an explorative study for the diachronic one. We sampled N = 2687 Italians balanced for gender (M = 35.3). The participants consisted of Italian voters of three populist parties—Fratelli d'Italia (radical right-wing, n = 393), La Lega (center-right, n = 332), Movimento 5 Stelle (eclectic, more center-left oriented, n = 960)—and a center-left-mainstream party—the Partito Democratico (n = 1002). The associations to S-Ws were elaborated with the VOSPEC step of the SPAD-T statistical package. The representations of populism, the pandemic, and war differ, in terms of processes and contents, according to the political orientations of those who construct them and the socio-political context in which the participants in our survey found themselves. In some cases, the results confirm what is stated in the literature. Thus, for example, they showed the founding role of polarized and antinomic thinking and evaluative and emotional factors in the constructing populist representations. The emotional aspects are then more characterized by negative polarity and mainly concern the voters of populist parties in syntony with their leaders. Then, some results present new elements, such as in evaluating the elites and the politics. For the ELITES, it appears markedly negative only for M5S voters. For POLITICS, it is more negative for M5S and PD voters than the voters of the other two populist parties. Furthermore, for voters of the mainstream center-left party PD, the association of <charisma> to the LEADER stimulus is highlighted, which does not align with their political culture. A possible interpretation linked to the situation of widespread uncertainty is provided for this result. Concerning COVID, some results confirm what is stated in the literature regarding the denialist and conspiracy-mongering attitudes that emerge among the voters of the two right-wing populist parties. On the contrary, about SCIENCE, the associations appear positive for everyone, with the sole exception of FdI voters who also express some negative associations, a clear signal of the no-vax positions of this political area. Finally, relating to PEACE, more positive associations unexpectedly prevail among right-wing populist voters than the other voters, while for WAR, voters of the mainstream center-left party are those with the greatest negative associations. These results are interpreted in light of the political context preceding the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which may have influenced the associative responses.

The purpose of this study was to examine the written communication on Facebook of three Italian populist leaders of different political orientations—Giorgia Meloni (FdI, radical right), Matteo Salvini (League, center-right), and Giuseppe Conte (M5S, transversal, recently more center-left oriented)—and their followers from 2019 to 2022. Social representation theory was used to examine how language served as a tool for asserting power relations and reinforcing group identities. To this end, textual data analysis was conducted on corpora of posts and comments, followed by the application of multiple correspondence analysis to uncover latent factors of meaning for qualitative examination. The results revealed how leaders strategically used language to address the interests of their specific groups and reinforce their identities. The leaders’ discourses focused primarily on national identity, social ties, and issues consistent with their political ideologies. They also placed considerable emphasis on government actions and policies, particularly those related to employment, business support, and labor issues. In addition, colloquial expressions and informal language were often used to enhance their accessible communication style. In particular, Giorgia Meloni used “low” language, focusing on ingroup/outgroup dynamics and emphasizing sovereignty, patriotism, and Islamophobia. In contrast, Salvini shifted to a more positive emotional register, moving away from security and xenophobic populism. Conte, on the other hand, emphasized the institutional dimension and used a less “low” register in his language, exploiting the former role as prime minister to effectively assert his authority. Analysis of the comments provided valuable insights into the instrumental use of language, with followers mirroring the linguistic markers and emotional register of their leaders. This research underscores the importance of social media in enabling direct and personalized communication between leaders and their followers. The observed disintermediation tendencies reflect the populist strategy of establishing a direct connection with their base. In conclusion, this study demonstrated how language played a crucial role in the communication strategies of Italian populist leaders and their followers, shaping public perceptions and reinforcing group identities. The insights gained from this research offer a deeper understanding of the dynamics of political discourse in the context of social representation theory.

Marine Le Pen and Riikka Purra are the front-figures of right-wing populist parties in France and Finland. Known for their patriarchal and anti-feminist agendas, these movements remain dominated by men. However, the number of women, including political leaders, in far right and populist movements is growing. Thus, there is a call for research that focuses specifically on female right-wing populist political leadership. This chapter aims to contribute to previous literature right-wing populism and political communication with a multimodal critical discursive psychological study of Marine Le Pen’s and Riikka Purra’s online political mobilisation. More specifically, in this chapter we investigate how the two populist far right leaders deploy identity management strategies in their online communication—official Twitter accounts and political blogs—to construct and negotiate their position as female and right-wing populist political leaders, and how they flexibly rework, negotiate and navigate between these positions to rhetorically appeal to diverse audiences. Our results show three distinct yet in many ways intertwined ways in which these politicians positioned themselves as (female) political leaders. The positions were (1) the strong leader for both men and women, (2) the protector of ‘our’ vulnerable women and (3) the protector of men. In line with previous research demonstrating the paramount importance of social media for the political campaigning and mobilization of populist movements, the present study contributes to the critical social and political psychological study of right-wing populism theoretically, by examining the ways in which gender and political leadership is negotiated in female right-wing populist leaders’ discourse; methodologically, through deploying the analytic tools of CDP in a fine-grained analysis of online political mobilization; and empirically, by providing a novel comparative contribution to research on female populism in Europe.

The chapter presents some concluding remarks that underline the most innovative aspects of the volume, starting from which in-depth considerations are proposed that aim to recompose a unified picture of the investigations presented in the different chapters. The in-depth considerations are conducted from an interdisciplinary perspective ranging from psycho-social literature to political science, political philosophy, and sociology. The ideas presented in the introduction and new elements linked to populism are resumed. It starts from the results given by the different chapters to analyze the way of dealing with populism in reference to uncertainty, amplified by the outbreak of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, to the role of positive emotions, to the promotion of deliberative democracy, to leadership also linked to the mediatization of politics, to the function of social media. In doing this, it tries to counteract the entirely negative readings of contemporary times, proposing a vision more anchored to the recently developed positive psychology while enhancing the emancipatory role that the elements of conflict can have in responding to existing imbalances. Particular attention is paid to some right-wing populist women leaders, analyzed in one of the chapters of the volume, and their way of optimizing the use of social media to exercise effective leadership that seeks to bypass the dominant androcentrism in politics without questioning it. In doing these final considerations, reference is made to mainstream and critical scholars, both as authors of the chapters and as scholars present in the literature. The concluding remarks intend to provide a hybrid point of view that answers some of the questions posed by populism. Finally, the three psychologies of the beginnings of political psychology are compared - the psychology of crowds, the psychology of the public, and the psychology of the nation and the race - with their developments stimulated by the different forms of contemporary populism. I conclude by underlining with Gergen the importance, for research, of an ethical and moral tension towards the future, knowing that, however careful and rigorous our analyses may be, chance always intervenes to question the conclusions we had arrived at.