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2024 | Buch

Introduction Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

How Liberal Democracies Defend Their Cyber Networks from Hackers

Strategies of Deterrence

verfasst von: Nori Katagiri

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

This book outlines the main technological, legal, and operational options that liberal democratic nations have when confronting challenges in cyberspace. It offers a range of policy ideas they can adopt to make their defense stronger and deter future cyber-attacks. The author explores how liberal societies, especially those in the Western world, have so far confronted a variety of cybersecurity challenges by hackers in nondemocratic regimes like Russia and China. and zooms in on the main challenges that democratic states face in adopting strategies of cyber deterrence, and how those challenges shape their ability to actually deter hackers.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
The chapter introduces four themes of the book. First, challenges that are unique to cybersecurity, especially the difficulty of deterring and legally penalizing hackers, impose limits on the ability of states to benefit much from the traditional focus on denial defense and reliance on international rules. Second, political attributes that define states as democratic generate a set of strengths and weaknesses in the defense of their networks. Any cybersecurity strategy they adopt has both dimensions that they need to address. Third, some of the challenges that they face are so great that they have the effects of relatively empowering hacking groups that are part of or sponsored by authoritarian states. Finally, the search for strategic options for democratic states to manage the impact of strategic asymmetry presents two additional strategies to consider—offensive cyber operations and active defense strategy.
Nori Katagiri
Chapter 2. Democracy and Cyber Deterrence
Abstract
The chapter takes four steps to explore the relationship between democracy and cyber deterrence. First, I investigate the intellectual foundation of cyber deterrence, examine several types of deterrence strategies, and point out methodological challenges we face in analyzing cyber deterrence. Second, I show how key actors of democratic states such as voters, firms, civil groups, and NGO, often play a role in constraining the use of cyber force and how the constraints help attackers draw operational advantage. Third, I examine the strategic environment of Western and Asian democracies by investigating the tension with regimes in Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Lastly, I discuss how democracies in Western Europe, North America, and East Asia have responded to the threats they face.
Nori Katagiri
Chapter 3. Why Defensive Measures Are Too Defensive: Strategy of Denial
Abstract
In this chapter, I take three steps to discuss the merits and demerits of denial strategy. First, I explore how the strategy is designed to protect defenders from attackers in authoritarian regimes. I also point out a range of challenges that democracies have faced in cyberspace, which has generated preference for restraint and made denial defense a default response for many states. The second section focuses on challenges with denial strategy, including those of technical, political, and strategic nature, which render it a subpar strategy after all. Finally, I stress the importance of defensive interventions after breaches and examine how democracies may recover from incidents.
Nori Katagiri
Chapter 4. Why Hard Measures Are Just Too Hard: Strategy of Punishment Through Offensive Cyber Operations
Abstract
This chapter shows that there are competing perspectives on democracies conducting offensive cyber operations (OCO) for penal purposes and that democracies face challenges in the process of running offensive and defensive operations at once, the latter necessary to deal with hostile reaction. It will also reveal how democratic states may overcome challenges to do one of the most important tasks to carry out OCO—acquire targets. I will proceed to show how democratic states may address forces of potential opposition to the aggressive use of digital resources by examining the chance of cyberspace escalation and how voters and firms address their vulnerabilities to retaliation. Finally, I will discuss why cyber punishment has limited effects as a deterrent even though it does present some benefits for democratic states.
Nori Katagiri
Chapter 5. Why Soft Measures Are Too Soft: International Law and Norms
Abstract
This chapter advances two perspectives. First, while the strategy of using international legal frameworks and norms remains the popular recourse for many analysts of cybersecurity, its limited effects must be widely acknowledged and reflected in strategic considerations. While the rule of law has strong appeal for a broad base of citizens in liberal societies, we must remember that this strategy has long proven to be too “soft” to make deterrence work. Second, democracies’ limited success in strengthening the legal and normative regime has created an environment that is not conducive to their efforts to deter hackers. It has not only enabled authoritarian states to exercise their digital power against democratic states but also allowed other stakeholders to play a role in the governance of cybersecurity.
Nori Katagiri
Chapter 6. Between Hard and Soft: Active Defense Countermeasures
Abstract
This chapter advances two perspectives. First, as with other strategies to deter cyber attacks, there are challenges we need to know about efforts to run active defense as a means of deterrence. They include resource constraints, legal, normative, and technical limitations, and the possibility of retaliation. Second, even then, active defense measures offer a pragmatic option for democracies when it comes to cyber deterrence. I show that they enable defenders to discourage digital intransigence while suppressing forces of escalation. Relative to the other strategies we have examined, active defense strategy goes in the middle of intensity between “soft” measures (denial defense and international rules) and “hard” ones like punishment.
Nori Katagiri
Chapter 7. Conclusion
Abstract
In this chapter, I investigate two potential game-changers in cyberspace dynamics. First, I consider how technological development affects cyberspace deterrence by using Artificial Intelligence (AI) as an example to illustrate some of the major challenges that emerge, for both authoritarian and democratic states. Second, I examine one of the financial technologies that are most relevant to hacking—virtual currencies—to show how the blockchain technology has complicated the effort of democratic states to deal with groups that use them often, including ransomware groups. Finally, I offer a set of policy implications for democratic states.
Nori Katagiri
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
How Liberal Democracies Defend Their Cyber Networks from Hackers
verfasst von
Nori Katagiri
Copyright-Jahr
2024
Electronic ISBN
978-3-031-54561-0
Print ISBN
978-3-031-54560-3
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54561-0

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