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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

SoK: Parameterization of Fault Adversary Models Connecting Theory and Practice

verfasst von : Dilara Toprakhisar, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov

Erschienen in: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2024

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

Since the first fault attack by Boneh et al. in 1997, various physical fault injection mechanisms have been explored to induce errors in electronic systems. Subsequent fault analysis methods of these errors have been studied, and successfully used to attack many cryptographic implementations. This poses a significant challenge to the secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms. To address this, numerous countermeasures have been proposed. Nevertheless, these countermeasures are primarily designed to protect against the particular assumptions made by the fault analysis methods. These assumptions, however, encompass only a limited range of the capabilities inherent to physical fault injection mechanisms.

In this paper, we narrow our focus to fault attacks and countermeasures specific to ASICs, and introduce a novel parameterized fault adversary model capturing an adversary’s control over an ASIC. We systematically map (a) the physical fault injection mechanisms, (b) adversary models assumed in fault analysis, and (c) adversary models used to design countermeasures into our introduced model. This model forms the basis for our comprehensive exploration that covers a broad spectrum of fault attacks and countermeasures within symmetric key cryptography as a comprehensive survey. Furthermore, our investigation highlights a notable misalignment among the adversary models assumed in countermeasures, fault attacks, and the intrinsic capabilities of the physical fault injection mechanisms. Through this study, we emphasize the need to reevaluate existing fault adversary models, and advocate for the development of a unified model.

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Titel: SoK: Parameterization of Fault Adversary Models Connecting Theory and Practice
verfasst von: Dilara Toprakhisar
Svetla Nikova
Ventzislav Nikov
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Buch: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2024
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-58867-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-58868-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58868-6_17

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